Whither the UFLPA Entity List?
The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA), which took effect on June 21, 2022, is one of the strongest trade enforcement tools the United States has ever deployed in the name of human rights.
The law prohibits the import of goods produced, wholly or in part, in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), where Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Tibetans, and other minorities have been subjected to mass detention, coercive labor transfers, and pervasive state surveillance.
Passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, the UFLPA serves a dual purpose. It is both a moral rebuke to forced labor and a safeguard for U.S. economic security. Forced labor does not only brutalize people. It distorts markets, undercuts American businesses, and weakens legitimate global supply chains.
Why the Entity List Matters
At the heart of the UFLPA is the Entity List, a roster of companies and organizations known to rely on forced labor. Goods linked to these entities are presumed to be tainted and barred from entering the United States unless importers can provide clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
The Entity List is not merely punitive. It provides clarity to businesses operating in complex global supply chains and serves as a warning signal to companies worldwide about the consequences of exploiting forced labor. Each expansion of the list sends a clear message: access to the U.S. market is conditional on respect for fundamental human rights.
Despite its importance, the Entity List has grown unevenly. Between January 2024 and January 2025, approximately 78 new entities were added, reflecting a notable acceleration in enforcement. The largest single addition, 37 entities, occurred in January 2025. Since then, no new entities have been added.
This pause underscores the fragility of the UFLPA and its dependence on sustained political will.
UFLPA and Trump’s Foreign Policy
The UFLPA aligns squarely with the Trump administration’s “America First” approach to foreign policy. Economic leverage, rather than diplomatic symbolism, has been the defining feature of this worldview. Tariffs on Chinese goods, calls to reshore manufacturing, and demands for fairer trade terms all reflect the belief that the United States can discipline adversaries through market access.
The UFLPA applies this same logic. It denies U.S. market access to companies complicit in forced labor while pushing American firms to better understand and diversify their supply chains.
As Labor Secretary Chavez-DeRemer recently stated, “America First means keeping foreign goods made with forced labor off our shelves and ensuring American businesses aren’t put at a disadvantage.”
If the administration seeks to reduce reliance on China and protect U.S. jobs, enforcement of the UFLPA is not optional. It is essential.
Challenges Ahead
Tracing supply chains connected to Xinjiang is extraordinarily difficult. Chinese authorities actively obscure ownership structures, relocate Uyghur laborers across provinces, and erase public records. These efforts complicate both government enforcement and corporate due diligence.
Recent staffing cuts across DHS and other agencies that comprise the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF) have further weakened the government’s capacity to research and designate new entities. Without sufficient personnel, linguistic expertise, and intelligence support, the Entity List risks stagnation.
Businesses rely on the Entity List to identify high-risk suppliers. Samir Goswami, director of the Forced Labor program for Global Rights Compliance, has noted the Chinese government’s robust effort to obfuscate supply chains and the need for companies to routinely conduct open-source research to understand the risk to their supply chains. Goswami said, “[companies] should be doing this research every single day to find out what is their exposure to the Uyghur region and divesting from that almost automatically”.
What Needs to Change
To strengthen UFLPA enforcement and better support U.S. businesses, several priorities must be addressed:
Expand the Entity List regularly.
DHS and FLETF must accelerate the pace of entity reviews and additions. Inclusion on the list is not the end of the process. Continuous monitoring is required to detect rebranding, restructuring, or evasion.
Invest in personnel and intelligence.
Effective enforcement requires trained analysts, linguists, and legal experts. Sustained funding, access to commercial intelligence platforms, and coordination with the intelligence community are critical.
Support independent research.
External researchers play a vital role in exposing forced labor networks. Funding cuts to these efforts undermine enforcement. Research grants should support analysis of supply chain bifurcation, transshipment, and evasion tactics.
Improve international coordination.
Forced labor is a global problem. Coordination with Canada, the EU, and other partners can amplify enforcement efforts and close loopholes across markets.
Assess UFLPA’s impact.
Congress and the GAO should evaluate the effectiveness of UFLPA enforcement, including its impact on supply chains, trade flows, and labor practices.
Create a Trade and Economic Security Coordinator at the NSC.
A dedicated coordinator could align interagency priorities, resolve disputes, and ensure UFLPA enforcement supports broader national security objectives.
A Test of Resolve
The UFLPA reflects rare bipartisan consensus. Goods produced with forced labor should not enter U.S. supply chains.
The question now is whether that consensus will translate into sustained enforcement. A well-resourced and proactive UFLPA regime would protect American workers, weaken Beijing’s leverage, and reaffirm U.S. leadership on human rights. A timid approach would signal that moral commitments can be sidelined when enforcement becomes difficult.
The choice is clear, and the world is watching.
Roy Potts is head of The Potts Group, a global risk advisory firm. From 2023-2025, he served as the Director of the Entity List Office in the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Policy. He retired in 2025 after more than 30 years of service at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the U.S. Senate. This essay reflects his personal views and not those of the U.S. government.